University of Windsor

Scholarship at UWindsor
Law Publications

Faculty of Law

7-2018

Differentiation in International Environmental Law: Has
Pragmatism Displaced Considerations of Justice?
Patricia Galvao-Ferreira
University of Windsor, Faculty of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/lawpub
Part of the Environmental Law Commons, and the International Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Galvao-Ferreira, Patricia. (2018). Differentiation in International Environmental Law: Has Pragmatism
Displaced Considerations of Justice?. Global Environmental Change and Innovation in International Law,
21-41.
https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/lawpub/138

This Contribution to Book is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty of Law at Scholarship at
UWindsor. It has been accepted for inclusion in Law Publications by an authorized administrator of Scholarship at
UWindsor. For more information, please contact scholarship@uwindsor.ca.

2. Differentiation in International Environmental Law:
Has Pragmatism Displaced Considerations of Justice?
In N. Craik, C. Jefferies, S. Seck, & T. Stephens (Eds.), Global Environmental
Change and Innovation in International Law (Cambridge University Press,
2018).
By Patricia Galvao Ferreira
2.1.

Introduction

The Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL) scholarly movement
seeks to assess and to advance the ‘promise of international law to transform itself
into a system based, not on power, but justice’,1 by considering how global norms
impair or advance the interests of states in the Global South.2 This chapter seeks to
contribute to the TWAIL scholarly project by examining whether international
environmental law (IEL)’s norms and mechanisms have been a source of
international legal innovation by challenging entrenched global socio-economic
and power imbalances, making this field of law more supportive of the interests of
the South.
This chapter uses a TWAIL approach to understand evolution and innovation
in IEL in the context of the growing South-South divide, as some emerging
economies’ significant contributions to global environmental problems and their
financial and technological capabilities to protect the global comment environment
set them apart from other developing countries. It considers whether IEL has
incorporated innovative norms and mechanisms in this changing geopolitical
context that allow it to promote environmental justice at the global level.
The enduring academic interest in the normative bases and in the actual
performance of the principle of differentiation in IEL is reflected in the significant
number of publications over the last twenty-five years dedicated to its analysis.3
 Law Foundation of Ontario Scholar, University of Windsor Faculty of Law. I would like to thank

Timothy Stephens, Sara Seck and the other editors, and the participants of the Sixth ‘Four
Societies’ workshop, for their valuable feedback; and the International Law Research Program at
the Center for International Governance Innovation (CIGI) for supporting this research.
1 Antony Anghie, ‘What is TWAIL: Comment,’ ASIL Proceedings of the 94th Annual Meeting (5-8
April 2000), 39-40, 40.
2 Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law, vol. 37 (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2007); Balakrishnan Rajagopal, International Law From Below:
Development, Social Movements and Third World Resistance (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2003); Bhupinder S Chimni, ‘Third World Approaches to International Law: a Manifesto’
(2006) 8 International Community Law Review 3-27.
3 See, for example, Daniel Magraw, ‘Legal Treatment of Developing Countries: Differential,
Contextual, and Absolute Norms’ (1990) 1 Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law &
Policy 69-99; Anita Halvorssen, Equality Among Unequals in International Environmental Law:
Differential Treatment for Developing Countries (Boulder: Westview Press, 1999); Duncan French,

Differentiation refers to the allocation of burdens and costs of environmental
action among countries according to their economic and other capabilities. The
interest in the manifestation of differential treatment in the climate regime has
been particularly pronounced in recent scholarship.4 However, much of this
scholarship reveals ongoing ambiguity as to the normative underpinnings and the
legal and political implications of the differentiation principle in IEL. An important
segment of the existing literature argues that the principle of differentiation in IEL
has been able to serve a dual purpose: an instrumental role of incentivizing the
broad participation of developed and developing countries in multilateral
environmental agreements (MEA), and a value-based role in promoting the just
allocation of environmental burdens and costs between states with varying levels
of capacity.

‘Developing States and International Environmental Law: the Importance of Differentiated
Responsibilities’ (2000) 49 International & Comparative Law Quarterly 135-60; Yoshiro Matsui,
‘Some Aspects of the Principle of ‘Common but Differentiated Responsibilities’ (2002) 2:2
International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics 151-170; Philip Cullet,
Differential Treatment in International Environmental Law (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003);
Ruchi Annand, International Environmental Justice: A North South Dimension (Aldershot: Ashgate,
2004); Lavanya Rajamani, Differential Treatment in International Environmental Law (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2006); Tuula Honkonen, The Common but Differentiated Responsibility
Principle in Multilateral Environmental Agreements: Regulatory and Policy Aspects (Austin: Kluwer
Law International, 2009), Vol. V; Pieter Pauw et al, ‘Different Perspectives on Differentiated
Responsibilities: A State-of-the-art Review of the Notion of Common but Differentiated
Responsibilities in International Negotiations’, (2014) DIE Discussion Paper 6. See also articles of
the special 5th Anniversary edition of the Transnational Environmental Law Journal dedicated to
the principle of differentiation in global environmental governance, online at
https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridgecore/content/view/A1ADD34F30D624400DC36E5B5FEE22D7/S2047102516000315a.pdf/celeb
ration_of_the_fifth_anniversary_of_transnational_environmental_law.pdf.
4 Anil Agarwal and Sunita Narain, Global Warming in an Unequal World: A Case of Environmental
Colonialism (New Delhi: Center for Science and Environment, 1991); Joyeeta Gupta, The Climate
Change Convention and Developing Countries: From Conflict to Consensus?, Vol. 8. (Dordrecht:
Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997); Eric A Posner and Cass R. Sunstein, ‘Climate Change
Justice,’ (2008) 96 Georgetown Law Journal 1565-1612; Eric A Posner and David
Weisbach, Climate Change Justice (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010); Benjamin J.
Richardson, et al. (eds.), Climate Law and Developing Countries: Legal and Policy Challenges for the
World Economy (Cheltenham/Northampton: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2010); Henry Shue,
Climate Justice: Vulnerability and Protection (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014); Lavanya
Rajamani, ‘Ambition and Differentiation in the 2015 Paris Agreement: Interpretative Possibilities
and Underlying Politics’ (2016) 65:2 International & Comparative Law Quarterly 493-514;
Christina Voigt and Felipe Ferreira ‘Dynamic Differentiation’: The Principles of CBDR-RC,
Progression and Highest Possible Ambition in the Paris Agreement’ (2016) 5:2 Transnational
Environmental Law 285-303; Patricia G. Ferreira, ‘From Justice to Participation: The Paris
Agreement's Pragmatic Approach to Differentiation’, in Randall S. Abate, Climate Justice: Case
Studies in Global and Regional Governance Challenges (Washington DC: ELI, 2016); Sandrine
Maljean‐Dubois, ‘The Paris Agreement: A New Step in the Gradual Evolution of Differential
Treatment in the Climate Regime?’ (2016) 25:2 RECIEL 151-160.
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Most of the recent scholarship on differentiation considers the evolution of,
and the debate around, the manifestation of this principle in the climate regime,
particularly the new model enshrined in the 2015 Paris Agreement.5 The existing
literature also considers differentiation primarily from the perspective of a NorthSouth divide. This chapter re-embeds the analysis of the principle of differentiation
in the climate regime, both in the broader context of differentiation in MEAs and
beyond the North-South dichotomy. It examines the evolution of the principle of
differentiation in IEL from the 1972 Stockholm Declaration6 to the 2015 Paris
Climate Agreement from the perspective of environmental justice, considering the
position of emerging economies with respect to the principle of differentiation
over time.
The chapter considers whether the normative proposition that the principle
of differentiation in IEL has promoted equitable treatment and environmental
justice between unequal states at the global level is in fact confirmed in state
practice. It challenges two arguments that have been recurrently used as
indications of a justice-based state practice of differentiation in IEL. The first
argument is the language in various provisions of international environmental
declarations and MEAs related to differentiation have explicitly embraced a justice
perspective, and that state practice following these instruments shows acceptance
of this normative basis for the principle in IEL. The second argument points to the
model of differentiation incorporated in the United Nations climate regime as
indicating states’ acceptance of a justice-based approach to differential treatment.
The study finds that there is little evidence of value-based state practice in
conformity with the principle of differentiation in IEL that reflects the pursuit of a
substantive notion of environmental justice. To be clear, this chapter does not
purport to offer a normative claim in relation to whether the principle of
differentiation should or should not advance the goal of achieving justice and
fairness. Rather, the main purpose of this chapter is to increase our understanding
of the limitations of the principle of differentiation in advancing international
environmental justice by examining how it has operated in practice.
The chapter proceeds in four sections. Section two briefly states the working
definitions of environmental justice and the principle of differentiation in IEL used
in the paper. Section three unpacks the normative bases for differentiation in IEL.
Section four challenges existing assertions in the literature that states have
embraced the concept of justice-based differentiation in IEL. Section five presents
concluding observations.

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Paris Agreement (Paris Agreement),
12 December 2015, FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1, in force 4 November 2016.
6 UN Conference on the Human Environment, ‘Stockholm Declaration on the Human
Environment’, 16 June 1972, UN Doc.A/Conf.48/14.
5
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2.2.

Environmental Justice and the Principle of Differentiation

There is no single definition of ‘environmental justice’. The expression has
been used both to refer to a fundamental moral source from which legal rules
emerge, and to the ‘ultimate goal or outcome to be achieved by legal norms’.7 For
analytical purposes, one can categorize the most commonly used
conceptualizations of environmental justice along the classic distinctions between
procedural, corrective and distributive justice.8
Procedural environmental justice refers to the full participation of those
affected by environmental risks or harms in environmental lawmaking and
policymaking. Procedural environmental justice has limited relevance to debates
around the principle of differentiation, although it can be argued that states in the
Global South often lack the capacity to participate fully in the negotiation and
operation of environmental treaties because of financial and other capacity
restraints, and this can carry important substantive outcomes in terms of the
development and implementation of international law.
Corrective environmental justice refers to a system of legal institutions and
procedures designed to provide remedies and to facilitate dispute settlement
related to environmental harms and conflicts. This aspect of ex post corrective
environmental justice is also of less relevance to the differentiation principle.
However it should be noted that, corrective environmental justice does invite
questions as to how to make those state or non-state actors currently responsible
for environmental harms and risks bear burdens and costs of restorative and
preventive environmental action proportionate to their contributions.
The third conception of environmental justice, distributive environmental
justice, is most relevant to differentiation. It refers to fair and equitable
distribution or allocation of the burdens and the costs to address collective
environmental risks or harms among State and non-State actors. It involves the
assessment of these burdens and costs according to their diverse financial and
technical capabilities, and having regard to their respective needs or priorities.
The principle of differentiation, or differential treatment in IEL, seeks to
guide the allocation of the burdens and costs of global environmental action among
countries according to: (a) their respective contributions to global environmental
problems; (b) their capabilities to undertake and to finance environmental action;
(c) and their development needs.9 The principle of differentiation has been
characterized as an innovative tool to incorporate corrective justice considerations
in IEL in advance in order to avoid environmental harm.10 The principle of
differentiation has also been said to incorporate distributive environmental justice
considerations in MEAs, as it seeks to provide support for those states without
financial or technical capacity to comply with environmental standards. The
Dinah Shelton, ‘Using Law and Equity for Poor and the Environment’, in Yves Le Bouthillier, et al
(eds), Poverty Alleviation and Environmental Law (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2012),
15.
8 This categorization draws from Shelton, above note 7.
9 Rajamani, above note 3, 150.
10 Honkonen, above note 3.
7
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following section discusses the normative bases of the principle of differentiation
in IEL.

2.3.

Unpacking the Normative Bases for Differentiation in IEL

Forty-five years after the 1972 ‘Stockholm Declaration on Human Environment’11
first introduced a reference to differentiated responsibilities in IEL, and thirty-five
years after the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (‘Rio
Declaration’)12 expressly incorporated the principle of common but differentiated
responsibilities and capabilities into IEL, there is still much debate as to the legal
basis of this principle, as well as to which normative underpinnings best explain
state practice on differentiation.13 Based on the extensive literature on
differentiation in IEL, the normative bases of the principle of differentiation can be
systematized according to two distinct objectives or approaches: a value-driven
approach (promoting justice among unequal states), and a pragmatic or
instrumental approach (promoting broad participation).
When one analyses state practice, it becomes clear that the value-driven and
the instrumental approaches to differentiation are not mutually exclusive.14 States
certainly respond to both value-driven and instrumental motivations when
negotiating and implementing international agreements.15 States may be
motivated by distinctive objectives which depend on the issue at stake and on
contingent national politics and foreign policy strategies. It is worth noting that the
understanding of the principle of differentiation by individual states and groups of
states may also evolve over time, and are not permanently tied to the
interpretation of the principle as originally conceived at the time of signature or
ratification of the MEA.16

‘Stockholm Declaration,’ above note 6.
UN Conference on Environment and Development, ‘Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development’, 3-14 June 1992, UN Doc.A/CONF.151/26.
13 For a detailed discussion on the disputed conceptual basis of the principle of differentiation in
IEL see Duncan French, above note 2, and Rajamani, above note 3.
14 Cullet, above note 3.
15 Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal, ‘Values and Interests: International Legalization in the
Fight Against Corruption’ (2002) 31:1 The Journal of Legal Studies, 141-177; Walter Mattli, and
Ngaire Woods, The Politics of Global Regulation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009).
16 Sondre Torp Helmersen, ‘Evolutive Treaty Interpretation: Legality, Semantics and Distinctions’
(2013) 6:1 European Journal of Legal Studies 127-148.
11
12
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It may be difficult to affirm with certainty, for example, to what extent
different countries in the European Union accepted longer compliance periods for
developing countries in the Montreal Protocol17 out of pragmatic reasons to secure
their participation in the MEA, or due to some type of consideration of
environmental justice.18 Yet the point of this chapter is to argue that it is not only
possible, but also valuable, to identify how the intentions of a certain state party or
a group of states parties as to their preferred objectives for the principle of
differentiation in individual MEAs evolve over time. Identifying trends in how
states conceive differentiation in MEAs may illuminate the potential and the
limitations of this principle.
One way to investigate the prevailing approach to the principle of
differentiation in MEAs over time is to consider states’ positions in relation to the
markers usually associated with each normative basis of differentiation, and the
types of differential treatment that they have promoted in MEAs over the years.
We can identify three separate markers associated with differential
treatment in IEL to help understand the distinctions between the value-driven
approach and the pragmatic approach. These are: contributions to global
environmental problems, financial and technological capabilities, and
development needs.19 For example, countries are responsible for different shares
of contribution to global environmental problems such as marine pollution,
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions or biodiversity loss. While developed countries
are responsible for 76 per cent of cumulative CO2 emissions (from 1850-2002),20
five developing countries (China, Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand and
Vietnam) accounted for 55 to 60 per cent of plastic waste entering the oceans in
2015.21
Financial and technological capabilities that determine the ability of
countries to address global environmental problems also vary significantly among
states.22 While in 2015 ‘high-income economies’ had an average GNI per capita of
US$12,476 or more, ‘upper middle-income economies’ presented a GNI per capita
between US$4,036 and $12,475.23 At the bottom half of GNI per capita, ‘lower
middle-income economies’ had an average of only between US$1,026 and $4,035,
while ‘low income economies’ lingered further behind, with a GNI per capita of

Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (Montreal Protocol), 16
September 1987, 1522 UNTS 3, in force 1 January 1989.
18 Christopher D. Stone, ‘Common but Differentiated Responsibilities in International Law,’
(2004) 98:2 American Journal of International Law, 276-301, 285.
19 Dinah Shelton, ‘Equity’ in The Oxford Handbook of International Environmental Law (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2012), 639-662; and Rajamani, above note 3.
20 Kevin A. Baumert, Timothy Herzog, and Jonathan Pershing. Navigating the Numbers: Greenhouse
Gas Data and International Climate Policy, (World Resources Institute, 2005), 32.
21 ‘Stemming the Tide: Land-based strategies for a plastic-free ocean’, (2015) Ocean Conservancy.
22 Shelton, above note 19.
23 World Bank, calculated using the World Bank Atlas method, online:
https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/906519-world-bank-country-andlending-groups.
17
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US$1,025 or less.24 Technological capabilities tend to be positively correlated to
GNI levels. Indeed, GNI per capita is often used as a proxy of capabilities.
If developing countries need to invest their already scarce resources in
actions to tackle global environmental challenges, they may jeopardize their ability
to address other pressing problems such as poverty, lack of adequate health care,
high unemployment and gender inequality.25 The UNDP Human Development
Index (HDI), which integrates three dimensions of human development (ability to
lead a long and healthy life, ability to acquire knowledge and ability to achieve a
decent standard of living), shows significant differences among the group of
countries classified as ‘very high human development’, ‘high human development’,
‘medium human development’, and the group of countries classified as ‘low human
development’26 in these three dimensions the HDI is used as a proxy to describe a
state’s development needs.
In addition to assessing whether differential treatment provisions
incorporate three core elements (contributions, capabilities and development
needs), another way to distinguish whether the primary objective of
differentiation in a regime is value-driven or instrumental is to compare it with the
various types of differentiated norms in IEL. In this respect, Rajamani organizes
differential treatment in MEAs into three distinct categories:
1. Provisions that differentiate among parties with respect to implementation
of treaty obligations, including delayed compliance schedules, adoption of
subsequent base years, delayed reporting frameworks and facilitative
(rather than punitive) approaches to non-compliance;
2. Provisions that grant financial and technological assistance or that provide
capacity building to help certain parties (normally developing countries, or
least developed countries) comply with treaty obligations; and
3. Provisions that differentiate among parties with respect to central,
substantive obligations of the treaty (like obligations establishing GHG
emissions targets only for developed countries).27
Parties take these stark variations in contributions, capabilities and
development needs into consideration when defining the types of differential
treatment in a treaty. But what motivates countries to consider these markers and
types of differentiation? According to the value-driven approach to differentiation,
equal treatment to unequal states would impose unfair or impracticable burdens
on those parties to MEAs that are least able to bear them, thus exacerbating
existing global inequalities.28 In this case, differential treatment represents an

Ibid.
UNDP, Human Development Report 2016: Development for Everyone (2016).
26 Ibid.
27 Rajamani, above note 3, 93.
28 Shelton, above note 19, especially 640; Philip Sands and Jacqueline Peel, Principles of
International Environmental Law (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), especially 235;
Sumudu Atapattu, Emerging Principles of International Environmental Law (New York: Brill,
2007), 384; Pauw, et al, above note 3, 6; Cullet, above note 3, 21.
24
25
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application of the principle of distributive justice in international law, and takes
into consideration capabilities and development needs.29
The value-based approach to the principle of differentiation also includes a
second, distinguishable proposition: when some states have disproportionately
contributed to a collective problem, allocating burdens and costs equally among all
states would be unjust to those less responsible.30 Consequently, those states
responsible for a larger share of contribution to the collective problem – both
historic and current – should be allocated a larger share of the burdens and costs
to address it.31 This idea has parallels with the polluter pays principle in
environmental law, which is the notion that polluters should bear the cost of their
polluting activities.32 In this case, differential treatment is an application of the
principle of corrective justice in international law.33 Because the value-driven
approach is rooted in justice considerations, advocates of this approach to
differentiation tend to argue for legal provisions that will clearly enshrine the
differentiated responsibilities in legal norms.34
The instrumental approach to differentiation, on the other hand, proposes
differential treatment as a means to achieve the objective of multilateral
agreements. Differentiation can be a way of expressly recognizing unequal
conditions as a pragmatic and political gesture to foster international cooperation
to solve common global problems.35 In this case, considerations of the overall
efficacy of a multilateral treaty, rather than purely justice considerations, would
justify differential treatment. Providing different compliance regimes, financial
support, technology transfer and capacity building to those countries with
insufficient capabilities, or with proportionally lower capabilities, would both
Shelton, above note 19; Philip Cullet, ‘Differential Treatment in Environmental Law: Addressing
Critiques and Conceptualizing the Next Steps’ (2016) 5:2 Transnational Environmental Law 305328, 306, 308.
30 Dinah Shelton, ‘Describing the Elephant: International Justice and Environmental Law,’ in Jonas
Ebbesson, Environmental Law and Justice in Context (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2009).
31 Cheng Zheng-Kang, ‘Equity, Special Considerations, and the Third World’ (1990) 1:1 Colorado
Journal of International Environmental Law & Policy 57-68; Philippe Sands, ‘The ‘Greening’ of
International Law: Emerging Principles and Rules’ (1994) 1:2 Indiana Journal of Global Legal
Studies 293-323, 311; Subrata Roy Chowdhury, ‘Common but Differentiated Responsibility in
International Environmental Law: from Stockholm (1972) to Rio (1992)’, in Konrad Ginther, Erik
Denters and P. J. I. M. de Waart, Sustainable Development and Good Governance (Boston: M. Nijhoff,
1995).
32 Simon Caney, ‘Cosmopolitan Justice, Responsibility, and Global Climate Change’ (2005)
18:4 Leiden Journal of International Law 747-775. Caney discusses the pros and cons of the
application of the polluter pays principle in the climate regime, including retrospectively
addressing past emissions (a proposition that remains controversial). He argues that the polluter
pays principle needs to be supplemented by the ‘ability to pay principle’. See also
Rajamani, above note 3, 137.
33 Shelton, above note 30.
34 Sands and Peel, above note 28.
35 Plurilateral (or minilateral) governance or regulatory initiatives can be defined as those
involving sub-groups of actors involved in multilateral initiatives. See German Development
Institute, ‘Between Minilateralism and Multilateralism: Opportunities and Risks of Pioneer
Alliances in International Trade and Climate Politics’ (2015) DIE Briefing Paper 16.
29
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attract broad participation and promote effective implementation of global
environmental standards. 36
Scott Barrett argues that international agreements perceived as fair in their
allocation of burdens and costs among unequal states induce broader participation
and favour treaty compliance.37 By offering certain forms of preferential treatment
in trade agreements, for example, developed countries can enlist the participation
and cooperation of developing countries in their preferred goal of global
commerce liberalization.38 By granting some forms of differential treatment to
developing countries in the climate regime, developed countries would ensure that
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)39
covered a comprehensive share of the global GHG emissions.40 The instrumental
approach to differentiation also tends to favour facilitated compliance regimes for
certain parties based on capabilities, with all parties subject to the same, universal,
standards rather than differentiated core legal obligations based on contributions
or development needs.
Differentiated implementation timetables and provisions to grant support
for a group of countries to implement universal standards can be associated with
both the value-driven and the instrumental approaches. Differentiation in core
obligations, on the other hand, tend to be associated primarily with the valuedriven approach based on corrective justice. Table 1 (below) organizes the various
normative bases, markers and types of differential treatment.

Halvorssen, above note 3; Günther Handl. ‘Environmental Security and Global Change: the
Challenge to International Law’ (1991) 1 Yearbook of International Environmental Law 3-33;
Posner and Weisbach, above note 4; Stone, above note 18.
37 Scott Barrett, Environment and Statecraft: the Strategy of Environmental Treaty-making (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2005); Scott Barrett and Robert Stavins, ‘Increasing Participation and
Compliance in International Climate Change Agreements’ (2002) 3:4 International Environmental
Agreements 349-376; see also Philippe Cullet, ‘Differential Treatment in International Law:
Towards a New Paradigm of Inter-state Relations’ 10:3 European Journal of International Law
549-582.
38 Nicolas Lamp, ‘How Some Countries Became ‘Special: Developing Countries and the
Construction of Difference in Multilateral Trade Lawmaking’ 18:4 Journal of International
Economic Law 743-771.
39 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 9 May 1992, 1771 UNTS 107, in
force 21 March 1994.
40 IPCC 2014, Fifth Assessment Report, especially Chapter 13, online:
https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/.
36
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Table 1
Normative
bases or
justification
1)

Markers

Justice (valuebased)

2)

Broad
cooperation
(instrumental)

-

Contributions to
environmental problems
(corrective justice linked
to polluter pays principle)

-

Capabilities (distributive
justice)

-

Capabilities
Development needs

Types of provisions

-

Unequal substantive
obligations

-

Facilitated implementation
Financial and technological
assistance

-

Facilitated implementation
of substantive obligations
Financial and technological
assistance

-

The next section examines whether there are grounds to conclude that state
practice reflects a justice-based approach to differentiation.

2.4.

Examining state practice on differentiation in IEL

The literature usually advances two arguments to justify why states accept a valuedriven approach to the principle of differentiation in IEL. The first argument points
to the existence of explicit references to asymmetrical contributions to
environmental problems and diverse capabilities to undertake environmental
action in key environmental declarations and in various MEAS.41 Those references
would prove that the principle of differentiation seeks to advance corrective justice
or distributive justice in IEL. The second argument points to the manifestation of
differentiation in the climate regime, which was directly linked to asymmetrical
contributions to GHG emissions and capabilities, as proof that IEL has embraced a
justice-based approach to differentiation along a North/South divide. 42
Cullet, above note 29, especially 310-314; Sands and Peel, above note 28, 234; Honkonen, above
note 3, 410.
42 Sumudu Atapattu, ‘Climate Change, Equity and Differentiated Responsibilities: Does the Present
Climate Regime Favor Developing Countries?’ (2008) Conference Proceedings on “Climate Law in
Developing Countries post-2012: North and South Perspectives” organized by IUCN Law Academy,
41
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With the advantage of hindsight, it is now possible to challenge those two
arguments. The primary reason for this is because there has been a significant
disparity between treaty texts (which do embrace a justice-approach to
differentiation) and the actual practice of states over the last twenty years in
implementing their treaty obligations. A second reason is that the model of
differentiation in the UNFCCC climate regime, which was for a time clearly linked
to contributions, has been significantly modified towards a pragmatic approach by
the 2015 Paris Agreement, with developed states and emerging economies now
treated in an increasingly similar way.
2.4.1.Disparities between treaty text and state practice
The 1972 Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment marked an important
global recognition of the planetary scale of environmental degradation and that
collective international norms and mechanisms were needed in response.43
Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration established the responsibility of states
‘to ensure that the activities within their jurisdiction and control do not cause
damage to the environment of other states or areas beyond the limits of national
jurisdiction’.44 The Stockholm Declaration recognized states’ common
responsibility to protect the environment, while also highlighting the need for
differentiation based on capabilities, by prompting the international community to
consider
the systems of values prevailing in each country and the extent of the
applicability of standards which are valid for the most advanced
countries but which may be inappropriate and of unwarranted
social cost for the developing countries, and the need for financial
and technical assistance.45
It is important to note that the 1972 Stockholm Declaration did not clearly
address responsibilities for historic environmental contributions to
environmental harm. A series of important MEAs became associated with the
Stockholm Conference, including the 1972 Convention for the Prevention of
Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matters,46 the 1972 Convention
for the Protection of World Cultural and Natural Heritage,47 and the 1973
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora
3; Tomilola Akanle Eni-Ibukun, International Environmental Law and Distributive Justice: the
Equitable Distribution of CDM Projects Under the Kyoto Protocol (New York: Routledge, 2014), 20.
43 Oscar Schachter, ‘The Emergence of International Environmental Law’ (1991) 44:2 Journal of
International Affairs, 457-493.
44 Stockholm Declaration, above note 6.
45 Ibid. See Edith Brown Weiss, ‘International Environmental Law: Contemporary Issues and the
Emergence of a New World Order’ (1993) 81 Georgetown Law Journal 675-710, 703.
46 Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter
(London Convention), 29 December 1972, 1046 UNTS 120, in force 30 August 1975.
47 Convention Concerning Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, 16 November
1972, 1037 UNTS 15511, in force 17 December 1975 (World Heritage Convention).
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(CITES).48 These conventions include flexible timeframes for implementation and
delayed compliance schedules for developing countries, but no differentiation in
substantive obligations which are linked to differing contributions to the extent of
the problem targeted by the relevant treaty regime.
In fact, global discussions on differentiated standards based on historic
responsibilities for global environmental problems would gain momentum only a
few years later, in the context of global discussions over a New International
Economic Order (NIEO). The NIEO was a transnational governance reform initiative
led by developing countries in the early 1970s, with the fundamental objective
‘to transform the governance of the global economy to redirect more of the benefits of
transnational integration toward “the developing nations”’.49 It involved reforms in
global economic institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank, as well as in the
global trade regime. Although developing countries won a nominal victory with the
United Nations General Assembly adopting the NIEO declaration by consensus in
1974, actual reforms in global economic institutions failed to materialize.50
Rajamani argues that ‘the rhetoric of the NIEO … [found] expression in the
field of IEL where notions of culpability (of industrial countries), entitlement (of
developing countries) and non-reciprocal obligations are aired and offered
guarded support’.51 In the lead up to the 1992 Rio Conference, several MEAs were
being negotiated in parallel, including the UNFCCC. It was in this context that most
of the explicit references to disproportional contributions to environmental
problems would appear in MEAs such as the UNFCCC and the Convention on
Biological Diversity (CBD).52
The preamble to the United Nations General Assembly Resolution that
convened the Rio Conference expressed concern that ‘the major cause of the
continuing deterioration of the global environment is the unsustainable pattern of
production and consumption, particularly in industrialized countries’.53 The
Resolution affirmed that ‘the responsibility for containing, reducing and
eliminating global environmental damage must be borne by the countries causing
such damage, must be in relation to the damage caused and must be in accordance
with their respective capabilities and responsibilities’.54 The Resolution further
stated that ‘the largest part of the current emission of pollutants into the
environment, including toxic and hazardous wastes, originates in developed
countries’, and that therefore, developed countries ‘have the main responsibility
for combating such pollution’.55
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), 3
March 1973, 993 UNTS 243, in force 1 July 1975.
49 Nils Gilman, ‘The New International Economic Order: A Reintroduction’ (2015) 6:1 Humanity:
An International Journal of Human Rights, Humanitarianism, and Development, 1-16.
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52 Convention on Biological Diversity, 5 June 1992, 1760 UNTS 79, in force 29 December 1993.
53 UN Conference on Environment and Development, GA Resolution 44/228 (1989).
54 Ibid.
55 Ibid.
48

32

This resolution was the first time that the ‘contributions’ marker was
explicitly used in the context of differentiation in IEL. The Rio Summit therefore
marked an important moment for the justice-based approach to the principle of
differentiation. The 1992 Rio Declaration also established the concept of
sustainable development as the centerpiece of IEL, linking together environmental
protection and economic development.56 This linkage reinforced the idea that
developing countries could legitimately seek international support to address
environmental challenges while at the same time reducing poverty and promoting
socio-economic development.
Principle 7 of the Rio Declaration reads as follows:
In view of the different contributions to global environmental
degradation, States have common but differentiated responsibilities.
The developed countries acknowledge the responsibility that they
bear in the international pursuit of sustainable development in view of
the pressures their societies place on the global environment and of
the technologies and financial resources they command.57
Principle 7 therefore officially incorporates the ‘contributions’ notion in the
lexicon of differentiation in IEL. Yet, the declaration maintains reference to the
‘capabilities’ idea as well. Principle 6 gives ‘special priority’ to the ‘special situation
and needs of developing countries, particularly the least developed and those most
environmentally vulnerable.’58
The inclusion of this reference to contributions in the Rio Declaration was
met with resistance by some developed countries, particularly the United States.
The United States delegation issued an interpretative statement to Principle 7 of
the Rio Declaration to make clear that it was rejecting the idea of a corrective
justice differentiation linked to contributions:
The United States understands and accepts that principle 7 highlights
the special leadership role of the developed countries, based on our
industrial development, our experience with environmental
protection policies and actions, and our wealth, technical expertise and
capabilities. The United States does not accept any interpretation of
principle 7 that would imply a recognition or acceptance by the United
States of any international obligations or liabilities, or any diminution
in the responsibilities of developing countries.59
Most MEAs at the time did not include different central obligations related to
asymmetrical contributions. They relied primarily on differentiation related to
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, above note 12.
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implementation, or on financial support and technology transfer as a means to
support compliance by developing states, concepts that are associated with the
instrumental approach to differentiation. This shows a disconnect between the few
explicit instances of recognition of justice-based differentiation related to
contributions and the politics of treaty lawmaking and treaty implementation. The
exception was the UNFCCC. The UNFCCC established differentiated core
obligations, albeit temporarily in principle, between developed and developing
countries.
The specific references to historic contributions to environmental damage in
the Rio Declaration and its associated MEAs reflect the geopolitical and ideological
context in which these texts were negotiated.60 And despite the explicit references
to these ideas in these foundational legal instruments of IEL, actual differentiated
legal obligations reflecting these respective contributions have remained
exceedingly rare in substantive provisions. Differentiated obligations expressed in
more favorable compliance regimes for developing countries (for example
extended timeframes for compliance and provisions of support through delivery
of technical assistance, capacity building or financial transfers) are significantly
more common.
Most instances of differential treatment in IEL are arguably more compatible
with considerations of enlisting broad participation (instrumental) than
promoting corrective or distributive justice (value-based). One notable exception
is the manifestation differentiation in the climate regime, which has often been
pointed to as evidence of state practice in justice-based differentiation.
2.4.2.Confounding Exception: Climate Justice Differentiation
In this section it is argued that the justice-based model of differentiation in the
UNFCCC and in the Kyoto Protocol61 was a deviation from the general pattern of
instrumental differentiation across IEL. The model of differentiation enshrined in
the 2015 Paris Agreement62 has brought the climate differentiation closer to the
pragmatic paradigm that prevails in other MEAs.
Unlike other MEAs, the UNFCCC, and the subsequent Kyoto Protocol,
established a regime of differentiation between developed and developing
countries with respect to central obligations, particularly the obligation to reduce
GHG emissions. This differentiation in core obligations had clear links to
contributions to GHG emissions associated with global warming.63 The UNFCCC is
distinctive in expressly stating that ‘developed countries should take the lead’64 in
Jeffrey McGee and Jens Steffek, ‘The Copenhagen Turn in Global Climate Governance and the
Contentious History of Differentiation in International Law’ (2016) 28:1 Journal of Environmental
Law , 37-63.
61 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 10 December
1997, 2303 UNTS 148, in force 16 February 2005, arts. 2, 3.
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64 UNFCCC, above note 39, Art. 3.1, Art. 4.2 (a).
60

34

meeting the objective of the Convention due to their historic responsibilities and
greater capabilities. The concept of leadership was understood as requiring the
industrialized countries to ‘go first’ in reducing GHG emissions, while developing
countries should only later begin to limit or to reduce their GHG emissions.
In practice, developed countries listed in Annex I were required to adopt
national mitigation policies to modify long-term trends in GHG emissions.65
Meanwhile, non-Annex I countries (all developing countries) would voluntarily
adopt national mitigation programs, with support from developed countries under
the UNFCCC regime (financial support, capacity building and technology
transfer).66 The Kyoto Protocol reinforced this binary model of differentiation by
only establishing mitigation obligations for Annex I countries, at least for the first
commitment period.
In other words, developing countries were not simply given flexibility and
support towards the implementation of core universal obligations, as was the
instrumental approach adopted in other MEAs. This stark model of North-South
differentiation, based on asymmetrical obligations linked to historic contributions
to global emissions and capabilities, was the closest to the concept of corrective
justice and distributive justice which was favoured by developing countries.67
Despite being an exception, linking differing contributions to differentiated
obligations came to be considered as part of the menu of ‘widely accepted
[differential treatment] in treaty and other practices of States.’68
Writing in 1994, in the aftermath of the Rio Declaration and the creation of
the UNFCCC, Phillipe Sands argued that differentiated responsibilities comprised
two aspects: it responded to the special needs of developing countries, while also
accounting for ‘each state’s contribution to the creation of a particular
environmental problem and its ability to respond to, and limit and prevent, the
threat.’69 Sands went on to say that in practical terms the principle of
differentiation in IEL is ‘likely to lead increasingly to the development and
application of differing environmental standards between and among different
states […].’70 Sands contended that the practice of translating differentiation into
different legal obligations ‘seems likely to develop further.’71

Ibid, Art. 4.1, Art. 4.2.
Rajamani emphasizes this unique feature of differentiation under the UNFCCC: see Rajamani,
above note 3, 89.
67 Rajamani, above note 3, 194.
68 Sands and Peel, above note 28, 309. Developed countries have however always expressed
strong resistance for the concept of linking historic contributions to differentiation. Therefore
what was accepted was the linkage between current contributions and differential treatment.
Rajamani, above note 3, at 194.
69 Ibid, 308.
70 Ibid.
71 Ibid, 310.
65
66

35

This view illustrates a common assumption among commentators at the time
that the principle of differentiation in IEL had a progressive nature and would
move from provisions to support the implementation of universal standards in
developing countries based on needs (a pragmatic approach) to differentiated core
legal obligations based on contributions and capabilities (a justice-based
approach). Edith Brown Weiss, however, cautioned that considerations of equity
and fairness related to the principle of differentiation in IEL were the object of
pointed conflict in both the negotiation and the implementation of MEAs following
the 1992 Rio Declaration.72 The conflicts were especially salient in the climate
regime under the UNFCCC.
The conflict over the manifestation of differentiation in the UNFCCC and in
the Kyoto Protocol, with its emphasis on justice considerations, is said to have
compromised universal participation in emissions reductions in the climate
regime.73 The United States, expressly rejecting the idea of granting emerging
economies exemptions from common climate mitigation obligations, refused to
participate in the climate regime under the Kyoto Protocol terms. 74 Other
developed countries including Canada, Japan and Australia would also come to
express opposition to the idea of exempting emerging economies with significant
emissions from fulfilling legal obligations under the Kyoto Protocol.75 Emerging
economies continued to resist assuming any future obligations, despite significant
and growing emissions. 76 The negotiations for a new climate agreement to replace
the Kyoto Protocol were tasked at finding a new balance in this challenging context.
77

The negotiations included proposals to establish a spectrum of obligations,
based on countries’ different contributions, capabilities and development needs.78
Developed countries would have the most stringent obligations, based on their
Weiss, above note 45.
Jutta Brunee and Charlotte Streck, ‘The UNFCCC as a Negotiation Forum: Towards Commom but
More Differentiated Responsibilities’ (2013) 13 Climate Policy 589-607, 594.
74 Kathryn Hochstetler, ‘Climate Rights and Obligations for Emerging States: The Cases of Brazil
and South Africa’ (2012) 79 Social Research 957-982, 958.
75 Thomas Deleuil and Tuula Honkonen, ‘Vertical, Horizontal, Concentric: The Mechanisms of
Differential Treatment in the Climate Regime’ (2015) 5 Climate Law 82-93. For a detailed political
science account of the changing negotiating group dynamics in climate negotiations, with an
emphasis on emerging economies, see Kathlyn Hochstetler and Manjana Milkoreit,
‘Responsibilities in Transition: Emerging Powers in the Climate Change Negotiations’ (2015) 21:2
Global Governance 205-235. Brunnee and Streck, above note 73.
76 Andrew Hurrell and Sandeep Sengupta, (May 2012) 88:3 International Affairs 463-484, 467.
77 Henry Shue,’Face reality? After you! A call for leadership on climate change.’ (2011) 25:01
Ethics & International Affairs 17-26.
78 On the many proposals for intermediary levels of obligations for emerging economies, see
Michael Weisslitz, ‘Rethinking the Equitable Principle of Common but Differentiated
Responsibility: Differential versus Absolute Norms of Compliance and Contribution in the Global
Climate Change Context’ (2002) 13:2 Colorado Journal of International Law & Policy 473-509;
Edward A. Page, ‘Distributing the Burdens of Climate Change’ (2008) 17:4 Environmental Politics
556-575; Alina Averchenkova, Nicholas Stern, and Dimitri Zenghelis, ‘Taming the Beasts of
‘Burden-sharing’: an Analysis of Equitable Mitigation Actions and Approaches to 2030 Mitigation
Pledges, (2014) Policy Paper Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment.
72
73

36

greater historic contributions and per capita emissions, and having regard to their
greater capabilities. Emerging economies with significant absolute GHG emissions
would have intermediary obligations, based on their lower contributions per
capita, their lower capabilities compared to developed countries, and their
development needs. Other developing countries with marginal contributions and
low capabilities would receive support for voluntary climate action. A model with
scaled obligations linked to contributions, capabilities and needs would have
maintained the justice-based approach to differentiation in the climate regime.
However, the many attempts to arrive at a formula of differentiation based
on a combination of the three markers failed.79 Developed countries and emerging
economies maintained their entrenched positions, refusing to let emerging
economies evade significant climate commitments and relinquishing the idea of a
corrective and distributive based approach to differentiation linked to historic and
per capita contributions and capabilities respectively.80 Only in 2007, during the
negotiations that led to the Bali Action Plan, 81 did the position of emerging
economies in defence of the stark binary approach to differentiation start to
soften.82
In the Bali Action Plan, states pledged universal climate action, with all
parties agreeing to do their share. Yet, states reiterated that climate action would
follow the principles of the Convention, and ‘in particular the principle of common
but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities.’83 It was unclear
how exactly this principle was to be manifested in the new climate agreement. This
overture by emerging economies to accept undertaking climate action led to
renewed momentum in the multilateral regime. States held intense negotiations
during the two years leading up to COP15 in Copenhagen. In 2009, the year of the
15th Conference, Barack Obama was elected President of the United States under a
political platform that included support for global climate action. President
Obama’s election reinforced hopes among many stakeholders that states would be
able to arrive at a new agreement in Copenhagen.84
For those advocating for a justice-based approach to differentiation, the
United States and other developed countries should take the lead by embracing
climate obligations that are more stringent and immediate than emerging
economies and other developing countries. Emerging economies should also
accept their measure of climate action, commensurate with their contributions,
capabilities, and development needs. As is well known, parties did not arrive at a
binding agreement Copenhagen, signing instead a nonbinding accord.85 This
accord presented a very different model for differentiation, where the link
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between contribution and capabilities with differential legal obligations was
significantly more diluted than in the Kyoto Protocol.
In Copenhagen, the United States and a key group of emerging economies –
China, Brazil, India and South Africa – agreed behind closed doors on a new
compromise to move multilateral negotiations forward: the Copenhagen Accord.86
The 2009 conference of parties in Copenhagen was marked by noticeable
divergences in the positions of emerging economies and other developing
countries in the climate regime.87 Without a broader consensus, states only ‘took
notice’ of the Copenhagen Accord.
The dominant view88 in the aftermath of COP15 in Copenhagen was that the
Conference illustrated the incapacity of multilateral negotiations to address
climate change, primarily due to the lingering North-South tension regarding
differentiation. Yet, developed countries and emerging countries did agree on a
new paradigm for differentiation in the climate regime in Copenhagen, one where
states would be self-defining their pledges based on their own understanding of
their share of contributions, capabilities and development needs. Looking beyond
the North-South divide, this was a crucial change in the climate regime. If initially
other countries resisted the new paradigm, because it had been decided in a noninclusive process, virtually all countries would come to accept this new paradigm
of differentiation in the climate regime in the years to come.
In hindsight, Copenhagen firmly planted the seeds for the seminal change in
the model of differentiation in the climate regime.89 This change has brought the
climate differentiation closer to the instrumental model adopted in other MEAs,
with some variations. In 2014, China and the United States announced their
intention to cooperate bilaterally on climate change, reinforcing their support for
a new concept for differentiation which includes other markers other than
contributions, capabilities and needs. In their proposal, they referred to to:
‘common but differentiated responsibilities and capabilities, in light of different
national circumstances’ (emphasis added).90 The expression ‘in light of different
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national circumstances’ allows Parties to consider criteria such as stages of
development, geographic size, and natural resources endowments when
presenting their pledges for climate action.
With the addition of this expression, the earlier strong correlation between
responsibilities for GHG emissions and capabilities and corresponding climate
burdens and costs in the climate differentiation has been officially attenuated by a
broadening of the markers for differentiation.91 If the position is taken that
differentiation should reflect a country’s contribution and capabilities in
significant ways, this model of differentiation departs from a just arrangement. It
moves towards a more pragmatic approach that seeks to promote voluntary
ambition while facilitating climate action, assessed according to national
circumstances which now go beyond contributions, capabilities and development
needs.
This pragmatic approach to differentiation was incorporated into the 2015
Paris Agreement.92 There is broad recognition that the 2015 Paris Agreement
represents a fundamental shift away from the categorical binary approach of the
Kyoto Protocol based on contributions and capabilities and towards a more
diffused form of differentiation that takes into account other markers or
parameters.93 In this sense the Paris Agreement represents an innovative turn in
international environmental law in response to changing needs, the most
important being the imperative to respond to rapidly worsening climate change.
However, to conclude that the Paris Agreement is therefore innovative is not to say
that it is necessarily fair or just. In any event, the Paris Agreement still builds on
the normative legacy of the UNFCCC, and therefore it retains some elements of
North-South differentiation based on contributions and capabilities.94 For
example, the Paris Agreement calls for developed countries to continue taking the
lead in climate action.95 This leadership, however, seems restricted to the
expectation that developed countries will (voluntarily) adopt nationwide
emissions reduction targets, while (mandatorily) providing financial resources for
climate action in developing countries.96 On the other hand, the common nature of
the responsibilities was strengthened, with all Parties to the Paris Agreement
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mandated to formulate, communicate, and update their nationally determined
contributions (NDCs).97
Christina Voigt and Felipe Ferreira argue that while the Paris Agreement
differentiation builds on the categories of ‘developed’ and ‘developing,’ countries,
it could eventually, over time, lead to common types of mitigation efforts as
emerging economies with high emissions move towards economy-wide reduction
targets.98 There is, however, no timeline for emerging economies to conclude this
‘graduation’ under the Paris Agreement, and whether emerging economies truly
agreed to this idea of convergence is debatable.99
Linking climate pledges to contributions and capabilities has become largely
a political exercise at the national level. The Paris Agreement seeks to restrain the
possibility of states using this autonomy to evade their responsibilities by creating
a system of oversight that leverages peer pressure for strong climate action. This
system is composed of an enhanced transparency framework (article 13) and
review processes (including article 14 on global stocktake and article 15 on
compliance mechanisms). Whether or not a country’s pledge will reflect its
contributions and capabilities will therefore depend on these provisions and in the
country’s national processes.
To sum up, to ensure a high uptake among states, particularly developed
countries and emerging economies, the differentiation model in the Paris
Agreement has departed from the strong focus on climate justice which associated
climate burdens and costs with responsibilities for contributions and capabilities
to act on climate. According to Rajamani, the Paris model of differentiation has
transitioned “from an ideological to a pragmatic basis.100 The Copenhagen model
of bottom-up pragmatic differentiation, embraced by the Paris Agreement, marks
the end of the exceptional nature of differentiation in the climate regime, bringing
it closer to the model of pragmatic differentiation that has prevailed in most other
MEAs.
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2.5.

Conclusion

Jeffrey McGee and Jens Steffek argue that the Paris Agreement model of
bottom-up voluntary pledges is an outcome of the United States’ opposition to
‘redistributive multilateralism’ and signals a ‘weakening’ of differentiation in
international environmental law.101An examination of the move towards the Paris
Agreement model of differentiation, in the context of differentiation in other MEAs,
illuminates other elements of this incomplete story.
First, the move towards a bottom-up system of voluntary pledge and review
in Copenhagen and the Paris Agreement, a system dissociated from notions of
contribution to environmental harm and the capability to address it, enjoyed the
support not only of the United States, but also China and other emerging
economies. It is more accurate, therefore, to suggest that states supporting a move
away from ‘redistributive multilateralism’ now include key emerging economies
with growing capacity to address global problems. TWAIL scholarship, concerned
with the role of international law in challenging or reinforcing global socioeconomic and political imbalances, will need to take the growing South-South
differences in interests and values into consideration in its future analyses of
international law. The rapid pace of climate change is generating normative
innovation which cuts across established political divides and legal categories.
Second, the differentiation in the Paris Agreement is not necessarily ‘weaker’
than in other MEAs. Instead, the Paris differentiation model reflects the end of the
exceptional climate model of differentiation that prevailed, at least until the Kyoto
Protocol aligned closely with corrective and distributive justice considerations
related to contributions and capabilities along a North and South divide. The
pragmatic new climate model of differentiation is more closely aligned with other
manifestations of differentiation in IEL, taking into account development needs
and low capabilities of Parties in order to facilitate and to promote compliance.
As it stands today, the principle of differentiation in IEL does not fulfill the
function of promoting a just global socio-economic and political order, as
advocated by TWAIL scholars. For those concerned with promoting a justice-based
approach to differentiation in IEL, there is a need for concerted efforts to change
state practice on differentiation in IEL, both by developed countries and emerging
economies. Alternatively, legal tools and policy techniques of IEL other than the
principle of differentiation may be used to advance distributive and corrective
justice in IEL. Future research can illuminate the role of environmental litigation,
mechanisms to address loss and damage, enhanced transparency frameworks and
the like in promoting equity and justice in IEL.
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